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Cognitive Metaphor and Literary Theory:
Towards the New Philology

Donald C. Freeman
University of Massachusetts. Amherst

Thanks to a growing body of unanswered criticism, a scandal over "science studies" involving one of
the most influential journals of "cultural studies" and
"theory," and a stunning recantation by one of its most
renowned practitioners, the ascendancy of so-called
literary "theory" may be coming to an end. Lest we
lapse unwittingly into one of "theory's" laziest intellectual habits. however, we must remember that in any
argument for paradigmatic change, mere critique of the
status quo, skepticism tout court, is only half the job.
"Just say no" is just too easy. For the other half of the
job-a start at repairing the damage that "theory" has
wrought literary criticism and scholarship--we need to
develop and institutionalize a new and serious program
for literary study.
After a brief account of the present state of affairs,
I will suggest such a program: what I call the New
Philology-a term encompassing such fields of study
as stylistic~, discourse structure, narratology, contemporary metrics, the European poetics descended from
the Prague School and Russian Fonnalism, the new and
growing body of research in cognitive metaphor,
and enough nonspecialist knowledge of contemporary
linguistics to do work in these fields. With the New
Philology as a basis. scholars and critics of literature
and the language of literature can begin restoring
literary study to the standing it once enjoyed as a
serious academic discipline.
In its contemporary form, "theory" began when a
French import solidified its presence on these shores.

That import was not a car. a cheese. or a perfume. It
was a product of French intellectual jouissance called
deconstruction. which became coupled to the distinctly
IJ(mjouissant Anglo-American lit-crit machine.
Deconstruction has eluded all efforts at succinct
definition, but we might characterize it as an effort to
interrogate existing paradigms of knowledge by dissecting the unstated assumptions, implicit metaphors.
etc., of the language in which these paradigms are expressed. Deconstruction marked the genesis of the new
"interdisciplinarity," a variety of scholarship in which
the researcher no longer needs to know much about the
"inter" discipline. In the case of this Ur-theorydeconstruction-the "inter" discipline was linguistics.
However, by declining to acquire at least the rudiments of modern linguistics. Jacques Derrida and his
disciples ignored the vast volume of contemporary linguistic research and theory. Instead, they "recuperated" a programmatic book representing the work of
the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who conveniently wrote in French, but inconveniently died
in 1913.
Now even if Derrida et al. had gotten right the
version of Saussure's work upon which they purport to
rely (and there is substantial unrebutted evidence that
they got it wrong), I have always found it passing
strange that for a philosophical and literary theory based
upon language. Derrida turned to a work, Saussure's
Course in General Linguistics, that predates by fifty
years the theoretical revolution that has created modern
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linguistics. This work, moreover, was not written
by the scholar whose name is on the title page, but
was produced by two of his colleagues and fonner
students relying entirely on their notes and those
taken by still other students on Saussure's lectures
in his introductory course in general linguistics,
which was unsurprisingly entitled "Course in General Linguistics."
It is rather as though we at this conference developed a revolutionary new theory of physics,
qualified as we are to theorize about physics, based
on the notes of three students in Mathematics 101
as it was taught by Albert Einstein at the Bundesinstitut fUr Technik in ZUrich at about the same
time. Most of us have suffered the damage to our
self-esteem consequent upon our reading in student exams and term papers their versions of our
lecture notes. But even if Charles Bally and Albert
Sechehaye, the two compilers of Course in General Linguistics had themselves gotten Saussure's
thought right (a matter that is not free from
doubt), that book is not the source of Saussure' s
standing among practicing linguists. Just as
Einstein was first a physicist and only secondarily
a mathematician, so was Saussure first an IndoEuropeanist, a very good one, and secondarily a
general linguist. Saussure's standing in linguistics derives chiefly from his brilliant hypothesis
about Indo-European laryngeals. developed in a
series of complex, technically detailed scholarly
papers that most of you doubtless know better
than I do--scholarly papers that are not, shall we
say, nightstand reading.
My purpose in this diatribe is not to beat up
on Saussure or the compilers of Course in General Linguistics-far from it. Rather, I mean
to argue that insofar as deconstruction is basic to
"theory" and "interdisciplinarity," and I believe
that it is both; and insofar as deconstruction as a
theory in and of itself is founded upon a conception of language, the House of Theory is like
unto a house built upon the sand, with the consequence, as this audience doubtless will recall,
that in the Gospel according to St. Matthew,
chapter X, verse 27, "the rain descended, and the
floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon
that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it."
Perhaps the theory crowd hasn't yet gotten to
the Sennon on the Mount. But the winds, at least.
have been blowing for a long time. The scope of
interdisciplinary "theory" has broadened from the
base of deconstruction into the New Historicism
and, most recently, into what has become known
as "cultural studies." In "cultural studies," more or
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less all knowledge has become the province of,
not sociology and anthropology professors, but
literature professors and their students. We have
seen books by English professors on pedophilia
and cross-dressing; dissertations by English Ph.D.
students on birthing and Los Angeles thrift shops.
The Miltonist Stanley Fish has published a book
on literary theory and the law'-not legal themes
in literature, but essays claiming to show how
"theory" can deconstruct court decisions, legal
principles, and the like. In an earlier essay that
became the title piece of his controversial book
There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, and
It's a Good Thing, Too," Fish ventured into Constitutional law, proposing that the United States
abandon Constitutional guarantees of free speech
that have been elaborated in more than two centuries of jurisprudence and are the envy of an
apparently unenlightened world. Instead, Fish
would assign authority over what speech shall be
permitted to whatever group currently holds political power. All of this work has made bold and
explicit claims for being "interdisciplinary" or
"multidisciplinary."
Most recently-and fatefully-"theory" has
ventured into what its practitioners call "science
studies." Philosophers and some social scientists
also are involved in this effort, but I will limit
myself to literature professors. The aim of this
work is to interrogate-to put in question, to
problematize-the scientific method, ideas of
empirical evidence, scientific objectivity, scientific "laws," and so forth. The flavor of this work
is perhaps best captured in a comment attributed
to (and not denied by) an editor of the leading
journal of this brand of cultural studies. Social
Text. Said he, "I won't deny that there is a law of
gravity. I would nevertheless argue that there are
no laws in nature, there are only laws in society.
Laws are things that men and women make, and
that they can change.'"
Imagine yourself to be someone who stands
outside this work, who has professional training,
perhaps primary professional training, in the discipline that is the "inter-discipline." the discipline
that is being joined to "theory." Further imagine,
if you will. that you believe that the "interdisciplinary" "theorist" who is writing about your field
of expertise knows little or nothing about it. What
do you do'? You can ignore it. That is what linguists did with deconstruction, for I do not know a
single linguist who believes in it. Nor am I aware
of any published critiques of the deconstructionist
enterprise by academics whose primary field of
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scholarly endeavor is theoretical linguistics.
Although linguists have taken up-indeed, have
revolutionized-many literary topics such as
metrics, narrative, poetic form, and metaphor, I
do not recall more than a half-dozen conference
papers or published articles on deconstruction
at meetings of the Linguistic Society of America
or in that body's journal, Language. Very few
critiques have been published of the New Historicism or cultural studies (with one significant
exception, to which I shall shortly turn); at the
same time, professional historians of my acquaintance have been bemused by what they see
as New Historicism's impossibly na'ive view of
historiography.
If you can't ignore "theory," you can take up
arms against it. John Ellis, who has published
extensively in both literature and linguistics, wrote
an annihilating critique, Against Decollstruction:
that sank virtually without trace. I have not seen a
single significant replyS to that short book from
any of the scholars whose line of work Ellis's
book absolutely demolishes.
In a sense, these unhappy developments are
not surprising. The problem with trying to refute a
body of work in the humanities, particularly in
literature, is that the concepts are very slippery,
and literary study has little if any tradition of
building upon a previous generation's work. As a
result. there is almost no philosophy of knowledge
about literary study.
Science, however. has a strong tradition of
building upon existing foundations. and an entire
discipline, the philosophy of science, devoted to
what should count as a scientific fact, scientific
argumentation, scientific method, and so on
(notice, by the way, that there is no such thing as
the humanistic method). So two scientists who believed scholars of "science studies" were ludicrously (one might say "Iudically") ignorant of
basic science attacked "science studies," in a book
called Higher Superstitioll." This critique drew
some attention in the academic world, but virtually
none outside it.
In the spring of 1996, however, this situation
changed dramatically. A physicist named Alan
Sokal wrote an article, "Transgressing the
Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,'" that appeared to be
a practicing physicist's conversion to the cause of
"science studies." Among the bolder claims in
Sokal's essay is his assertion that the famous
constant of Euclidean plane geometry, Jt, is a historically contingent variable.

Sokal submitted this farrago to the editors of
Social Text, who published it without demur, and,
significantly, without seeking the advice of a real
scientist, as opposed to a practitioner of "science
studies." Sokal's essay appeared in Social Text
as a regular article, part of a special issue on the
so-called "science wars."
Alas, simultaneously, and without telling the
editors of Social Text, Sokal published in the
gadfly journal Lingua Franca an essay' exposing
his "Transgressing the Boundaries" article as a
complete hoax. He adopted this strategy, Sokal
wrote, to show that "a leading North American
journal of cultural studies ... [would] publish an
article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it
sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions."" His Social Text article
was. Sokal wrote, a parody of "science studies"
that was, in his own words, "a melange of truths,
half-truths, quarter-truths. falsehoods, nonsequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that
have no meaning whatsoever."10 This tempest
burst forth from the academic teapot into a story
carried on the front page of the New York Times
one Saturday morning. A torrent of defenses,
counterattacks, and counter-defenses ensued, culminating (for the moment, at least) in a brilliant
essay in the New York Review o.{ Books eviscerating "science studies," written by Steven Weinberg, a physicist who holds the Nobel Prize. II
Dismayingly, Social Text's editorial standards
in the Sokal Affair attracted many staunch
and prominent defenders. In an essay on the
Op-Ed page of the New York Times, the ubiquitous
Fish assailed Sokal's demonstration as an ethical
lapse and sought to defend "science studies" by
comparing the rules of physics to the rules of baseball.'2 More sweeping defenses could be heard in
private academic corridor chat. A common theme
was that Sokal's action had "damaged interdisciplinary research." What the Sokal affair has damaged, of course, is had interdisciplinary research.
Equally disturbing has been the rhetorical success
of Social Text's defenders in damage control, limiting the scope of Sokal' s critique to "science studies" in an effort to obscure the larger issue of slipshod interdisciplinary humanistic research in
general. The thread of "interdisciplinarity" connects "science studies" to virtually all of the
remaining "theoretical" enterprises: the faux linguistics of deconstruction; what I am reliably
informed is the faux history of the New Historicism; the fau.t law of "legal studies," and the faux
anthropology and sociology of "cultural studies."
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The Sokal Affair has demonstrated with appalling
clarity that the "theory" undertaking has been
intellectually flawed from the start: circular, selfserving, and belligerently ignorant.
I believe that these events constitute a cautionary narrative. Its moral is: Bad things happen
when a bunch of mutually validating smart people
think that they are above the rules. For us as
academics, I think these rules include at least the
following obligations: to make our work and its
premises clear to our nonspecialist peers and
to the public; to answer serious critiques of our
work in serious and nondismissive ways; to be
willing in principle to modify or abandon positions when we cannot answer these critiques;
to protect the right of our intellectual adversaries to teach and publish their views. especially
when they oppose our own; to pronounce as
experts only where we possess expertise; and,
most importantly, to police our own disciplines by
calling to account the half-baked and the
meretricious.
My firm belief that literary study can be saved
from its current leadership may be, as Dr. Johnson
wrote of second marriages, the triumph of hope
over experience. Still. there is room for guarded
optimism. Some of the best and most ardent practitioners of "theory" are beginning to question
assumptions in which their careers are heavily invested. Frank Lentricchia, the quondam "Dirty
HarryLl of literary theory," has, without explicitly
admitting it, retracted most of his own "theoretical" work. Lentricchia writes:
If the authority of a contemporary literary

critic lies in his theory of x, then wherein lies
the authority of the theory itself? In disciplines
in which he has little experience and less
training, the typical literary critic who wields
a theory is not himself a sociologist, historian,
or economist, as well as a student of literature.
A scandal of professional impersonation? No,
because the impersonators speak only into the
mirror of other impersonators and rarely to
those in a position to test their theories for
fraudulence. An advanced literature department is the place where you can write a dissertation on Wittgenstein and never have to
face an examiner from the philosophy department. An advanced literature department is
the place where you may speak endlessly
about gender and never have to face the
scrutiny of a biologist, because gender is just a
social construction, and nature doesn't exist. I•
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Exactly. Even Fish, a brilliant critic, the best
of my generation, who nevertheless must bear
a large share of responsibility for the present
quandary of literary scholarship, has recently confessed that he "like! s I savouring the physical
'taste' of [literary I language at the same time that
[heJ workfs] to lay bare its physics.""
The convergence of these developments and
the Sokal Affair suggests that the time is now ripe
for a regeneration of literary scholarship using
analytical methods, some of which are new and
many of which have been around for a while
but virtually ignored by mainstream literary research.It> This body of work makes it possible to
develop what I am pleased to call "real theory":
accounts of literary works, oeuvres, genres, periods, etc., that are in principle predictive, explanatory. and falsifiable. Real theory is crucial to what
I want to call the New Philology; at the end of
this talk I will elaborate what I see as its crucial
aspects.
I focus here on one such methodology, cognitive metaphor. Cognitivists argue that metaphor is
a primary mode of thinking that is prior to and
not restricted to language. On this argument,
metaphor is constructed as schematized embodied
and enculturated experience-spatial stories, on
the latest account-that is projected into abstractions. Consider. for example. the many ways in we
think about the abstraction we call "life." One important way is to think of life as a journey along
a path. Cognitivists say that we project or map a
skeletalized mental representation, a schema, of
the elements and structure of our physical experience of journeys into the abstraction "life." Those
elements are a beginning, an end, a route or path
for the journey, something that moves (called a
"trajector"), and a vector of progress. The structure would include the fact that the path has margins and that the normal progress along the path is
forward from beginning to end. I7
Evidence for this analysis is found in idioms
like "he's reached the end of the road" (meaning
"he has died"), notions of our lives "getting sidetracked," that we're "getting on in years," the
idea of "career paths" or, more crucially for this
audience, "tenure tracks," and so on. But there
is literary evidence, too, in abundance: the first
line of the Divine Comedy ("Midway in the journey of our life"), Robert Frost's "The Road Not
Taken," Emily Dickinson's "Because I could not
stop for Death," and so on. The claim is that one
of the terms in which we think of life is that of
a journey.
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Or consider the many different abstractions
that we conceptualize in terms of our schematized,
embodied experience of containers. Containers
consist of a bounded periphery with an inside and
an outside. We often think of moods and states of
affairs as containers: we are "in a bad mood" or
"get into [and out ofl trouble." There is no a priori
reason why we should think of moods or states of
affairs in terms of containers. Yet we find ourselves "struggling to get out of bad relationships,"
we go "into" and "out of" debt, etc. Debts and bad
relationships inhibit our ability to act freely. In
cognitive terms, they constrain our freedom of
movement; we find it difficult to get from the inside to the outside of their containing periphery.
Cognitivists claim that our understanding of
these abstractions is not arbitrary, but consistent
with the independently motivated idea of metaphorical projection from our schematized, embodied experience of restriction and containment into
our frustrated desire to escape what limits our
freedom of movement. We map this physical experience into an otherwise unstructured, abstract
idea of the emotional state called a mood."
I want to demonstrate how these ideas become a program for "real" literary theory by committing a venial sin: reexamining part of an essay
I recently published ''! on one of the most analyzed
speeches in literature, the "Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow" speech in Machcth:
To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death.
Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow; a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
Machcth, V.v.19-2S.'"
By this point in Machcth the metaphorical
projection LIFE IS A JOURNEY, part of the PATH
schema, is well established in the play's dramatic
language. In Act I, when Duncan anoints Malcolm
as his successor, Macbeth remarks:
The Prince of Cumberland!-That is a step
On which I must fall down, or else o'erleap,
For in my way it lies.
Liv.4S-50.

In the depths of his despair in Act IV, the protagonist observes:
[M)y way of life
Is faWn into the sere, the yellow leaf;
And that which should accompany old age,
As honour, love, obedience, troops of friends,
I must not look to have ....
V.iii.22-26.
Here Shakespeare-typically, I suggestblends four metaphorical projections, BAD IS DOWN
(the opposite of GOOD IS UP, part of the VERTICALITY schema), LIFE IS A YEAR, LIFE IS A PLANT, and
LIFE IS A JOURNEY. This last metaphorical projection Shakespeare-again, typically-manages to
evoke a second time with one word, "troops,"
where old age is seen as a kind of triumphal
parade with troops of friends passing in reviewalong a path.
The CONTAINER schema is likewise well established by Act V. Lady Macbeth has remarked of
her husband in Act I that he is "too full 0 'the milk
of human kindness / To catch the nearest way"
(I.v.14-16). She understands Macbeth's body as a
container full of the wrong liquid. She would also
change the liquid that fills the container of her
own body and seal it:
Come, you Spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here,
And fill me, from the crown to the toe,
top-full
Of direst cruelty! make thick my blood;
Stop up th'access and passage to remorse;
That no compunctious visitings of Nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace
between
Th'effect and it!
I.v.40-47.
Both the PATH and CONTAINER schemas are
crucial in the "To-morrow" speech. There, the
path along which time once traveled so freely for
Macbeth has become contained within a "petty
pace." Shakespeare projects the schematized, embodied experience of containers onto the abstraction of depressed frustration. Macbeth is inside
the container of his crimes and their consequences, futilely seeking to escape to the outside.
These consequences are in the future, and it is
that future that constrains Macbeth to the "petty
pace" of those "tomorrows." Time and Macbeth
march in measured steps along each point. each
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day, of the "way to dusty death," which is as
inevitable an end to that path and that journey
as the pen of a civil servant recording a legal
document, left to right, syllable by syllable, until
the end of time.
Two vague measures of time now become
pluralized and reified in another iteration of the
LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. As they "light fools
the way to dusty death," our yesterdays (the
source point in the PATH schema) illuminate a path
forward that is now constrained by the clearly
visible terminal point of "dusty death." As the
"fools" of humankind inevitably march toward
that unmoving terminus, their-and Macbeth'spath becomes a shrinking container, as the
metaphors LIFE IS LIGHT and LIFE IS A JOURNEY
become fused, as is represented in Figure I.
Once we understand this passage as cognitive
metaphor enables us to understand it, as the projection from a complex of very simple, ordinary,
embodied experiences of JOURNEY, PATH, CONTAINER, and LIGHT, Shakespeare's sheer genius
unfolds. He lays out a precise horizontal spatial

tableau of human mortality (the "fools"), life itself
(the lamp held by "all our yesterdays"), the trajectory of our lives ("'the way"), and our lives' containment by the inevitable terminal point of "dusty
death." This horizontal spatial tableau now-in
four words, "Out, out, brief candle!"-is rotated
ninety degrees to the vertical, with those entities
and relationships intact. The path now has its
source point not in the illuminating lamp of "all our
yesterdays" but in the flame of the candle. That
flame of life-for LIFE IS LIGHT-is the trajector, the
moving entity, like the "fools" of 1.22. The flame
now moves vertically, down the brief path from its
present location in the candle's wick to its extinction at the unmoving terminal point of the candle's
base, just as the "fools" inevitably move horizontally toward the unmoving terminal point of "dusty
death." Life is still a journey, but that journey now
is down the candle-and BAD IS DOWN. The candle.
like the cone of light thrown by the illuminating
lamp of "all our yesterdays," is a bounded object.
When the candle goes out, darkness will fall, and
if LIFE IS LIGHT then DEATH IS DARKNESS.

Figure 1
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But that is not the end of this story. As candles
burn down, they cast flickering shadows. The steps
of that shadow are, like the "to-morrows" of the
speech's beginning, constrained to the very short
distance that an actor can "strut" (itself a short and
constrained step) upon a stage, which is a constrained locus, and for a very short time, much less
than the one-day minimum implied by "tomorrow"
and "our yesterdays."
Finally, Shakespeare's Macheth invokes the
common metaphor LIFE IS A STORY, describing life
as a "tale," one of the simplest prose literary
forms, prototypically a straightforward narrative
line without flashbacks or subplots. But the tale of
Macbeth's life is a "tale told by an idiot," and
tales told by idiots lack a coherent time schemethey are journeys without coherent beginnings and
ends. Macbeth' s mature career is, tinally, a narrative that is not a straight line but a meaninglessly
contorted and convoluted path, in which what
should have come at the end Chonor, love, obedience, troops of friends" [V .iii.25]) came at the
beginning, at a time when we think the natural
movement is upward from where we are.
Taken together, the CONTAINER and PATH
schemas interact in this speech to create a fourdimensional cognitive model of Macbeth's downfall: the path of his career becomes a container
that constrains him in height (he can only "creep"
and "strut"; he can no longer "o'erIeap," as he
does earlier in the play), that constrains him in
width ( the "syllables" of time are recorded-and
limited-horizontally; the actor-trajector in life's
drama can "strut" over no wider an area than
a theatrical stage), that constrains him in depth
(the "dusty death" of his end is now clearly lit and
visible), and that constrains him in time (Macbeth's "yesterdays" impel him toward a now enumerable and tinite set of "tomorrows"). There is a
reason why this speech is one of the most quoted
and analyzed passages in the literature of the
world-and I believe that a cognitive-metaphoric
analysis provides a perspicuous account of that
reason.
This kind of intense microanalysis is by no
means all that cognitive metaphor can tell us
about this play. I have come to regard Macheth as
a kind of Gesamtkunstwerk, one of those untranslatable German nominal compounds meaning
roughly "total or totalizing work of art." I tirst encountered that term in reading about the operas
of Richard Wagner, which some musicologist
(whose name I have long since forgotten) characterized as Gesamtkunstwerke. All of the great

variety of elements that make up the prototypical
Wagnerian opera fit together: Teutonic myth,
symphonic (rather than operatic) orchestral accompaniment, massive choral singing, powerful
theatrical staging of a richness and complexity
previously associated only with plays. Wagner
scored for orchestras and choruses that were
twice the customary size employed in operatic
productions. He even designed an instrument
called the Wagner tuba to get just the right brass
sound, the distinctive voice that we hear, for example, in the Siegfried's Funeral section of Die
Goetterdaemmerung. Wagner even wrote his own
libretti and then composed the music that tit them.
He designed and built a special opera house, the
Festspielhaus in Bayreuth, that would give maximum effect to his totalizing (often terrifyingly
totalizing) operatic vision. In Wagner's greatest
opera'>, everything tits.
I think Macheth is like that. Everything tits. It
is the shortest of Shakespeare's plays; I don't
think Macheth contains one extra word. And I
believe that cognitive metaphor as one basis for
"real" literary theory can demonstrate this claim
more persuasively than any other theory I know.
For once we accept that metaphor is not a matter
of language but a matter of thought prior to language-that, in Mark Turner's felicitous phrase,
metaphor is part of the literary mind"-we can
see that the interaction of the PATH and CONTAINER
schemas I have described captures not only the
language of the passages I have analyzed, but
many other elements of the play. Indeed, even the
critical language written about Macheth over
the last two centuries is dominated by PATH and
CONTAINER metaphors.
For example, by the time the play gets to the
"Tomorrow" speech, we have already seen Macbeth's career conventionally metaphorized as a
journey along a path. But the beginning of Macbeth's final downfall also invokes the PATH
schema. Birnam Wood travels a path toward its
terminal point of Dunsinane. Lady Macbeth sleepwalks-like that "tale told by an idiot," the path of
her journey is deranged: it has no coherent beginning or end. Shakespeare portrays Duncan's
deathbed as being in a room contained in a castle
contained within a wall, strongly foregrounding
each of these elements. Macbeth himself remarks
at dusk that "light thickens," as though it had been
boiled down in the container of the witches' cauldron whose contents are simmered, as they put it,
to a "gruel thick and slab." And Macduff as the
embodiment of retribution brings the CONTAINER
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and PATH schemas full circle. He finally forces
Macbeth literally to reverse direction on the path
of his life ("Turn, Hell-hound, turn" [V.viii.3]). In
his birth by Cesarean section, Macduff leaves
the container of his mother's womb "[u]ntimely
ripp'd" (V.viii.16) from the conventional childbearing path (metaphorized in English as "the
birth canal") when he begins the journey of his
life. Macheth is a Gesamtkunstwerk.
Now this analysis doubtless could be improved. But I do not know of any close-grained
study of this speech's language that connects
as much of that language as does this analysis to
the play's larger issues and other dramaturgical
elements: its plot, the structure of particular
events, and so on. I believe that these virtues arise
from the theory of language upon which it is
based, which in tum undergirds the program of literary research and scholarship that I propound
here.
Cognitive metaphor is an important part of
what I propose to call the New Philology. The
New Philology would assert for the present work
that literary criticism of dramatic poetry begins
with a rigorous analysis of its core metaphorical
projections, along the lines of the foregoing
claims for PATH and CONTAINER metaphors as
crucial to a reading of Macheth, part of which
I have articulated here; in Othello, the KNOWING
IS SEEING metaphorical projection and its progeny;
in KinK Lear,22 BALANCE metaphors; and, in
Antony and Cleopatra, metaphors of CONTAINER,
LINKS, and PATH. 21 This methodology most highly
values those analyses that give the deepest and
broadest account of those projections and their
operation in both the play's language and in its
plot, characterization, stage business, stage properties, etc.
I call this work the New Philology to make it
clear that I am not advocating a return to the Good
Old Philology that I was driven through: Gothic,
i-mutation in Old Norse, and Hartmann von Aue's
Middle High German courtly epic, Der Anne Heinrich. Memories. memories. That stuff sure was old,
but most of it really wasn't very good. Rather. I denominate this work The New Philology in the hope
that this approach to English studies will come to
be seen as the truly interdisciplinary venture in linguistics and literature that it is. At the same time. as
I have suggested, the rubric of the New Philology
would encompass other contemporary interdisciplinary research in the language of literature.
I do wish to acknowledge one link of the New
Philology to the past. There was a time when
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advanced students in literature-English literature, at any rate-studied English lanKuaKe and
literature, and were obliged as a part of their professional training to have firsthand acquaintance
with English and Germanic philology and the
then-contemporary analytical tools, knowledge,
and theoretical insights available for their study.
Justifications for that requirement have not weakened; on the contrary, the Chomskian and postChomskian theoretical revolutions in linguistics
and the huge expansion of our knowledge about the
human faculty of language greatly strengthen
the case for requiring that advanced literature
students study English language in its contemporary theoretical paradigms-for its substance, to
be sure, but just as important, for the intellectual
style of modern linguistics. Linguistics has traditions of frank and spirited debate; of fundamental
discussion of what constitutes a theory and how
a theory can be supported or falsified; of deep respect for facts and for evidence; and, despite the
strongly left-wing political orientation of many
prominent linguists (a commitment demonstrated
not only in words, but in deeds), a traditional reluctance to equate particular scholarly approaches
with personal politics. Contemporary doctoral
students in literature should have a more than
nodding acquaintance with contemporary theories
of language: syntax, phonology, semantics, pragmatics, discourse.
I believe that the decline to virtually zero of
philology-the broad range of linguistic fact and
theory that was crucial in the training of literature
scholars-has occurred pari passu with the ascendancy of "theory." I am convinced that at least
in the English-speaking world, the professional
training and now the paradigms of research and
publication in literary study have fallen prey
to an intellectual Gresham's Law: Bad ideas
have largely driven out good. Ideas that can be
parodied so successfully that the parody fools selfproclaimed experts are bad ideas. Ideas whose
proponents will not answer serious critiques are
bad ideas. Ideas expressed in deliberately and defiantly, even proudly, obscurantist language~.j are
bad ideas. Ideas that have been shown to be
founded on fundamental errors in the disciplines
of which their proponents profess knowledge are
bad ideas. Ideas whose defenders routinely engage
in ad hominem etfeminam attacks, guilt by association, and self-serving claims of personal and
political virtue are bad ideas. As I remarked to an
audience in Budapest three months ago, scholars in
that part of the world will perhaps have had more
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first-hand acquaintance than have my colleagues in
this country with the lethal combination of intellectual correctness and political correctness.
But it does not suffice, as I suggested at the
outset, to bemoan these developments, even though
the Sokal Affair has demonstrated that growing
academic and public concern about the decline of
the humanities is well founded. We must present a
constructive and serious alternative program to the
bad ideas of "theory." I believe that the New
Philology is such a program, one that can help redirect literary scholarship toward insights that are
rigorous. falsifiable, and humanized.
If we would but hear it, the Sokal Affair is a
wakeup call. Thanks to twenty and more years of
"theory," the serious study of literature has suffered enormous damage, the full consequences of
which are only beginning to be realized. 25 I believe that the New Philology offers us a promising
basis upon which to reconstruct the study of literature as an academic discipline: literary analysis
and criticism whose merits do not depend on its
author's politics; literary analysis and criticism
that is open, explicit. and arguable; literary analysis and criticism that is, in the best sense, real
literary theory. I belive that the New Philology is
such a program, one that can help redirect literary
scholarship toward insights that are rigorous, falsifiable, and humanized.
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